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Ranking residential properties by a multicriteria
single price model
R Cervello´, F Garcı´a and F Guijarro
Universidad Polite´cnica de Valencia, Valencia, Spain
This study describes an application of the multicriteria single price model (Ballestero) to the ranking of
alternatives. By a generalization of the original model, the equilibrium set of alternatives can be
characterized from the viewpoints, respectively, of the demander and the supplier, and from that the
efﬁciency index can be calculated. We demonstrate how, in a state of equilibrium, the two viewpoints
result inevitably in inverse orders of ranking. In contrast with other proposals for full ranking of
alternatives, the method used in the present study (i) assumes a moderate attitude on the part of the
decision maker towards risk, with a robust axiomatic basis; (ii) assigns weights to the criteria
independently of which alternative is being evaluated and the attitude (optimistic or pessimistic) of the
decision maker; (iii) produces a cardinal hierarchy of the alternatives and not just an ordinal one. The
model is illustrated by a sample of residential properties in the city of Valencia, Spain.
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1. Introduction
Regardless of the economic and ﬁnancial situation at the
time, the decision to buy or sell a home should be rational,
based on clearly deﬁned aims and taking account of all the
available market information. From the sellers’ viewpoint,
his/her aim must be to maximize the ratio between the sale
price and the features and attributes of the property. This
means obtaining the highest possible price in line with the
market, considering the property’s area, age, location, etc.
On the opposing side, buyers will try to obtain the best
combination of those variables—subject to their personal
preferences—at the lowest price possible.
This being the context, it becomes necessary to identify
the features that are relevant to price formation and to
quantify their respective importance. In the literature, this
has usually been done by means of hedonic price models
(Rosen, 1974). The hedonic approach views a residential
property as a homogeneous possession, but conceptualizes
it as made up of a basket of individual attributes such that
each of them contributes to providing one or more of the
home’s services. Hedonic prices are deﬁned as the implicit
prices of those attributes of the possession.
Sellers have an interest in knowing whether the price
they are asking is or is not above the market value of the
property (obtained from a set of recent transactions).
Conversely, buyers have an interest in knowing whether
the property on offer is being overvalued or whether
its price is a good market ﬁt. Sometimes there are buyers
who may be willing to pay a higher price based on
subjective factors. Under this circumstance, the seller
can get a price that is higher than the ‘objective’ market
price of the property. Furthermore, the role played by
investors in search of a real estate portfolio should
be considered. These are interested in buying and selling,
but not at any cost: if and only if the transaction cost
is reasonable. All sellers, buyers and investors seek to
know the ‘objective’ market price of the properties,
which depends on the features of the properties. This
information is of great interest for housing sellers and
buyers in the dealing process, and can help investors to
identify the best investment opportunities in the housing
market.
To compare and rank dwellings, it is fundamental to
establish the weight (valuation) of the different attributes
that deﬁne a property. Considering the most general form
of a utility function, Ballestero and Romero (1991, 1993)
make use of Compromise Programming (Yu, 1973; Zeleny,
1973, 1974) to establish a weighting system in which the
weight of each attribute is inversely proportional to the
difference between its ideal value and anti-ideal. The
weights are conceptualized as shadow prices and are
directly applicable to different economic scenarios posed
by the same authors (Ballestero and Romero, 1994). Among
Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1941–1950 © 2011 Operational Research Society Ltd. All rights reserved. 0160-5682/11
www.palgrave-journals.com/jors/
Correspondence: F Guijarro, Facultad de Administracio´n y Direccio´n de
Empresas, Universidad Polite´cnica de Valencia, Camı´ de Vera s/n,
Valencia 46022, Spain.
E-mail: fraguima@upvnet.upv.es
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
these, noteworthy is the full ranking of organizational
units in the efﬁciency models (Ballestero, 1999). A more
detailed economic interpretation can be found in Ballestero
(2002, pp 9094). The following section also provides a
brief interpretation of this choice of weights based on
Compromise Programming. Among the properties that
provide this technique a robust axiomatic basis, the
following ones should be cited: feasibility, least group
regret, no dictatorship, Pareto optimality, uniqueness,
symmetry, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (see
Yu (1985, pp 7174), for a detailed explanation of these
properties).
The single price model (SPM) of Ballestero (1999)
makes it possible to perform a hierarchy of the efﬁcient
alternatives, giving rise to what is known as an efﬁcient
alternatives ranking. SPM computes a cardinal ranking of
the units in a simple way, and is connected with an eco-
nomic scenario where the only hypothesis assumed is a
moderate pessimistic attitude towards the decision maker’s
risk (buyer or seller in our context).
It thus offers a possibility that is especially attractive in
the ﬁeld of selling and buying residential properties.
Suppose an owner decides to put his or her home up for
sale, and sets a price for it. The seller will not only want to
know whether that price undervalues the property in
comparison with other similar sold properties; the seller
will also want to know what position his or her offer
occupies in relation to these properties. In addition, SPM
makes it possible to perform a sensitivity analysis of the
results and reply to questions like, ‘By how many positions
will the ranking of a property change if the price is
modiﬁed?’ And a similar analysis can be performed from
the buyer’s viewpoint.
The present study proposes the use of SPM for the
objective analysis of efﬁciency and the cardinal ranking in
decisions governing the buying and selling of goods. With
the market price of a set of goods and their relevant features
as givens, the intent is to arrive at the efﬁciency index (EI)
of each and build a full ranking of them. SPM has recently
been applied successfully to the purchase of capital goods
(Talluri, 2002), to hospital efﬁciency (Ballestero and
Maldonado, 2004), and to selecting textile products
(Ballestero, 2004). The novelty of our proposal lies in its
ﬁeld of application, namely the ranking of residential
properties, and the double perspective adopted: seller and
buyer. Our aim, which is to ﬁnd a model of equilibrium
between the expectations of buyers and sellers, requires
some modiﬁcation of Ballestero’s original approach. It will
be shown how, in a situation of equilibrium, the differing
perspectives of buyer and seller lead inevitably to opposite
orders of priority, and that these orders are independent of
the decision maker’s attitude, whether optimistic or
pessimistic. In addition, the weights assigned to each
criterion are arrived at even more simply than in the
original SPM formulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 brieﬂy summarizes the working of SPM and
the connection with a well-known multiple criteria tech-
nique: Compromise Programming. Section 3 describes the
adaptation of the model to a situation of equilibrium
between suppliers and demanders in a general context.
Section 4 illustrates the foregoing by applying it to a
sample of residential properties in the city of Valencia,
Spain. Finally, there is a section giving our main
conclusions.
2. The single price model
This section intends to provide a summary of the general
aspects of the SPM model and its relation to Compromise
Programming, and serves as a basis for the subsequent
sections.
SPM treats a set of s beneﬁts and compares them to m
costs. In order to draw up a ranking based on the N initial
alternatives, aggregation (1) is proposed:
Yj¼
Xs
i¼1
uiyij Xj¼
Xm
h¼1
vhxhj j¼ 1; . . . ;N ð1Þ
together with its subsequent quotient for calculating the
EI (2):
EIj ¼ Yj=Xj ð2Þ
where Yj is the aggregate beneﬁt of the jth alternative, Xj is
the aggregate cost of the jth alternative, yij is the ith beneﬁt
of the jth alternative, xhj is the hth cost of the jth
alternative, with uiX0 and vhX0 being the weights of the
ith beneﬁt and hth cost, respectively. The problem can now
be expressed in terms of how to obtain objectively the
values of ui and vh, and for this a two-stage solution is
offered.
First Step: Classifying the alternatives into inefﬁcient and
non-inefﬁcient.
In line with the classic DEA model, an alternative is
inefﬁcient if and only if it is dominated by a convex
combination of other alternatives. Unlike in DEA, the
non-dominated alternatives are treated as non-inefﬁcient
instead of as efﬁcient.
Second Step: Calculating the EI.
In this step, the model constructs the EI (2) from the
set of alternatives classiﬁed in the preceding step as non-
inefﬁcient. Building the index requires quantifying weights
ui and vh in (1). Two assumptions are made for this
purpose: (1) the beneﬁts from the non-inefﬁcient alter-
natives must cover their costs, and (2) in constructing the
EI, it is important that the model does not overestimate
the difference between beneﬁts and costs in a way that
favours any particular alternative. Therefore, the assump-
tion is that the behaviour of those estimating the beneﬁts
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from the alternatives will be moderate, since overestimating
the beneﬁts of one of them will necessarily entail under-
estimating the others.
In the context of utilitarianism, the beneﬁts, unlike the
costs, follow the rule ‘more is better’. Transforming the
latter so that ‘more is better’, and assigning variables to
each of the sþm through zi, the resulting optimization
model is (3):
Min
Xsþm
l¼1
wlzl q
s:t:
Xsþm
l¼1
wlzljX1 j¼ 1; . . . ; n ð3Þ
Where the following transformations were carried out:
zlj ¼ yij for l; i ¼ 1; . . . ; s ð4Þ
zlj ¼ xhmax  xhj
for l ¼ sþ 1; . . . ; sþm; h ¼ 1; . . . ;m ð5Þ
wl ¼ ðuiÞPm
h¼1 vhxhmax
for l ¼ 1; . . . ; s; i ¼ 1; . . . ; s ð6Þ
wl ¼ vhPm
h¼1 vhxhmax
for l ¼ sþ 1; . . . ; sþm;
h ¼ 1; . . . ;m ð7Þ
The efﬁcient frontier is marked by points (8):
El ¼ ðz1; z2; . . . ; zl1; zl; zlþ1; . . . ; zsþmÞ ð8Þ
Where zl ¼min(zlj) denotes the anti-ideal or nadir value
and zl ¼max(zlj) denotes the ideal or anchor value in the
lth criterion, as usually referred to in Compromise
Programming. We must remark that anti-ideal and ideal
values are obtained from the non-inefﬁcient set of
alternatives.
Points (8) are brought into model (3) in the form of
constraints:
wlz

l þ
X
m
wmzm ¼ 1 l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; sþm ð9Þ
with m¼ 1, 2, . . . , l1,lþ 1, . . . , sþm. In this way, a
linear system of (sþm) equations is obtained. The practical
justiﬁcation for including these constraints will be ex-
plained in the next section.
Using a theorem from Ballestero and Romero (1993),
it can be demonstrated that when the set of constraints (9)
is added to model (3), the solution for w is unique and is
given by expression (10) independently of the alternative
that is under consideration in the objective function:
wl ¼ 1
ðzl  zlÞ½1þ
Psþm
m¼1
zm
,
ðzm  zmÞ
l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; sþm ð10Þ
In this way, the EI of the jth non-inefﬁcient alternative
can be calculated by ratio (11):
EIj ¼
Ps
i¼1 wiyijPm
h¼1 wsþhxhj
ð11Þ
and from that the ranking of alternatives can be arrived at
directly.
As stated in the introduction, the weights wl are inversely
proportional to the difference between the ideal value and
the anti-ideal in the criterion lth. Figure 1 represents the
problem in a bicriteria space. Suppose that the criteria follow
the rule ‘more is better’, and that locus F (convex) is deﬁned
by the set of non-dominated alternatives. The criteria c1 (c2)
has the ideal value c1
(c2) and the anti-ideal c1(c2).
Consequently, the ideal point I of coordinates (c1
, c2) is
located in the non-feasible region. Following Zeleny’s axiom
of choice, the F alternatives closest to I will be preferable.
Among the different metrics that can be used to quantify
the distance to I is the inﬁnite metric, which is the metric
used to represent the LN path. The weights that must hold
with the equality w1(c1
c1)¼w2(c2c2) are derived speciﬁ-
cally from this path. The cross point between the boundary
F and the LN path identiﬁes the feasible alternative closest
to the ideal I in inﬁnite metric. Point L1 corresponds to the
alternative closest to the ideal point in metric one. In a
bicriteria problem, the application of other metrics would
give rise to other solutions within the segment delimited by
L1 and LN, the so-called compromise set (Yu, 1973).
Ballestero and Romero (1991) demonstrate how under
the hypothesis of the marginal rate of substitution law, any
utility function deﬁned on the criteria c1 and c2 reach a
solution within the compromise set.
Figure 1 Compromise set in a bicriteria space.
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3. Full ranking of goods by means of an adapted single
price model
As stated in the Introduction, this study proposes that SPM
be used for the objective analysis of efﬁciency in decisions
concerning sale and purchase of goods (alternatives). Our
proposal should be understood to be a generalization of the
SPM model, in which the viewpoints of both the buyer and
the seller, rather than just one of their viewpoints, are
considered in the full ranking of goods. In our proposal, it
is assumed that all the decision makers have the same
objective preferences so as to exclude the subjectivity of the
analysis. The exclusion of subjectivity, understood as the
individual decision-maker preferences, ensures to get a one
and only ranking of alternatives. If the perception of each
criterion is different depending on the particular decision
maker, or the weight of the criteria is different for each
decision maker, there will not be only one ranking. In this
case, the relative position of the alternatives could be
modiﬁed depending on who is the decision maker. When
applying the proposed model, the decision maker must be
aware of and test the moderate attitude that is assumed to
be basic in the model, as well as the features of the
equilibrium set obtained in each particular application.
The proposal depends on modifying the original model,
and for that we must ﬁrst give some deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Good non-inefﬁcient for the buyer
A good is to be considered non-inefﬁcient from the buyer’s
viewpoint if there is no convex combination of goods that
would have a lower or equal price with a higher or equal
level of features.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Good non-inefﬁcient for the seller
A good is to be considered non-inefﬁcient from the seller’s
viewpoint if there is no convex combination of goods that
would have a higher or equal price with a lower or equal
level of features.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Equilibrium set
Given a set of goods whose sale/purchase price is known
and a vector of features that are relevant to the valuation
of the goods, then the equilibrium set of goods is composed
of those that are non-inefﬁcient from the viewpoint of both
the buyer and the seller.
It can be seen that Deﬁnition 3.3 makes a good deal of
sense economically speaking. If the goods in a set S all
possess the same features but different prices, then the
dearest of them, A, is non-inefﬁcient for the seller, while
the least expensive of them, B, is non-inefﬁcient for the
buyer. However, neither of them will likely be chosen for
the transaction. In that set, good A will be the choice of the
seller but the least attractive to buyers. The same reasoning
can be applied to good B, with the result that neither of
them will end up being sold. In fact, no other good in set S
is likely to change hands if the market is transparent,
because both sellers and buyers can ﬁnd better alternatives
within the same set. Consequently, the equilibrium set will
contain only those goods that are equally attractive to both
buyer and seller, that is to say non-inefﬁcient from both
points of view. In other words, the assumption is that a sale
is only likely to be transacted when neither buyer nor seller
can ﬁnd a more efﬁcient alternative. If the data set only
comprises already sold goods, and not a combination of
offered and demanded goods, then the reason why A and B
should be excluded from the equilibrium set is also clear:
we would have alternatives with similar features but with a
different price, which in a transparent market might imply
that (i) some relevant criteria have not been considered or
that (ii) the perception of some of these criteria is different
depending on the buyer/seller who take part on the
transaction. This would fail to fulﬁl the non-subjectivity
assumption previously remarked. In this situation, both A
and B should be excluded from the equilibrium set.
First Step: Determining the equilibrium set of goods
The buyer seeks to maximize the ratio between the utility of
the features in the vector of features of the good and the
offering price, while the seller does the opposite. To put
it in the terminology of efﬁciency analysis, for the buyer
the price acts as the single cost (what the buyer gives) and
the features of the good as the different beneﬁts (what the
buyer receives), and vice versa for the seller. Take cij as the
value of the ith feature of the jth good and pj as the price of
the jth good, then the equilibrium set of goods is arrived at
by model (12) for a¼ 1, . . . ,N.
Min
1
2
ðjsa þ jbaÞ
s:t:
XN
j¼1
jsj cijcia 8i
XN
j¼1
jsj pjpa
XN
j¼1
jsj ¼ 1
XN
j¼1
jbj cijXcia 8i
XN
j¼1
jbj pjppa
XN
j¼1
jbj ¼ 1
js;jbX0 ð12Þ
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A good is deemed non-inefﬁcient if the objective
function takes value 1, and inefﬁcient otherwise. Essen-
tially, a good will be non-inefﬁcient if it is non-inefﬁcient
both for the buyer and the seller. Consequently, model (12)
simply includes the buyer and seller models in a single
mathematical programming model.
Second Step: Full ranking of the goods
The second step only treats the goods constituting
the equilibrium set from the ﬁrst step. One of the
difﬁculties in applying SPM in this step is the need to
distinguish between costs and beneﬁts. The problem
arises because what is a cost for the buyer is a beneﬁt for
the seller; and vice versa, what the seller sees as a cost the
buyer considers as a beneﬁt. Nevertheless, Proposition 3.1
below demonstrates that the criteria weights are indepen-
dent of whether the criterion is cost or beneﬁt. This makes
it possible to implement the second step by means of a
model that is even simpler than the proposal of Ballestero
(1999).
Proposition 3.1 The weight of a criterion is independent of
whether the criterion is considered a cost or a beneﬁt.
Suppose a set of s beneﬁts corresponding to m costs.
In SPM, the constraint corresponding to the ﬁctitious
alternatives wlz

l þ
P
m wmzm ¼ 1 generates the following
set of equations:
w1ðz1  z1Þ ¼ w2ðz2  z2Þ
¼    ¼ wsþmðzsþm  zsþmÞ ð13Þ
Take v4s and h¼ vs. Applying a trivial transforma-
tion on the original criteria results necessarily in:
wvðzv  zvÞ ¼ wv½ðxh max  xh minÞ
 ðxh max  xh maxÞ
¼ wvðxh max  xh minÞ ð14Þ
Thus, (12) can be expressed as a function of the sþm
original criteria:
w1ðy1  y1Þ
¼    ¼ wsðys  ysÞ ¼ wsþ1ðx1  x1Þ
¼    ¼ wsþmðxm  xmÞ ð15Þ
with yi
 ¼max(yij), yi ¼min(yij), xh ¼max(xhj), and
xh ¼min(xhj).
Expression (15) provides the same solution as (10), if we
perform the transformations zl j¼ yij for l, i¼ 1, . . . , s and
zl j¼xh maxxhj for l¼ sþ 1, . . . , sþm, h¼ 1, . . . ,m.
Thus, it is demonstrated that the weights are independent
of whether a speciﬁc criterion is a cost or a beneﬁt.
Corollary 3.1 The EI regarded from the buyer’s viewpoint
is inversely proportional to the EI from the seller’s
viewpoint.
Suppose without loss of generality that price is the ﬁrst
criterion and that the m features inﬂuencing the price
occupy the next following positions. Then the EI on the
seller’s side can be calculated by (16):
EIj seller ¼ w1yjPmþ1
h¼2 whxhj
ð16Þ
while the buyer’s side index requires expression (17):
EIj buyer ¼
Pmþ1
h¼2 whxhj
w1yj
ð17Þ
Resulting from Proposition 3.1, and given that the
equilibrium set is the same for both sides, the weights of
each criterion are likewise identical for both buyer and
seller. It follows that expression (17) is the exact inverse
of (16). This relationship only holds if the second step is
applied to the goods in the equilibrium set and not to the
two sets of non-efﬁcient goods that would result from
taking the viewpoints of buyer and seller separately.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Moderate pessimism
A moderately pessimistic decision maker is one who
assumes conservatively that the most favourable in a set
of possibilities is not the one that will ultimately take place
(Ballestero, 2002).
This is a key deﬁnition in the SPM approach, as was
indicated previously. Including the set of ﬁctitious alter-
natives that make up the system of equations (9)—called
a marginal set in Ballestero (2002)—is clearly justiﬁable
on practical grounds. It deals with alternatives that have
extreme values for their criteria (the highest value for one
of the criteria, the lowest value for the rest), which makes
them less attractive than other, better-balanced criteria.
Ballestero (2002) shows that this constraint makes the
non-inefﬁcient alternatives attain values greater than unity;
that is, they are preferable to the ﬁctitious alternatives.
The ﬁctitious alternatives are all assigned a value of 1, so
that they are all equally preferable for a moderately
pessimistic decision maker. The equal ranking for these
alternatives is not followed by other Multi-Criteria
Decision Analysis approaches, as swing weights in Multi-
Attribute Utility Theory models, that explicitly ask the
decision maker to compare and rank such alternatives.
Nevertheless, since our main objective is to get a one and
only ranking of the alternatives, this ranking cannot
depend on the individual preferences of a single buyer/
seller. This would mean, in the most extreme case, to have
as many rankings as buyers or sellers.
R Cervello´ et al—Ranking residential properties 1945
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Let the set of alternatives be the following:
a1 ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs; . . . ; zsþm
a2 ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs; . . . ; zsþm
. . .
as ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs ; . . . ; zsþm
. . .
asþm ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs; . . . ; zsþm ð18Þ
Presented with this set, an extreme pessimist would
only consider a single alternative, the one consisting of the
worst values for the criteria. A moderately pessimistic
decision maker admits the possibility that one criterion
may reach the highest possible value while the others take
the minimum value. Taking this moderately pessimistic
approach, let us compare, without loss of generality, alter-
natives a1 and a2. It follows from Deﬁnition 3.4 that a
decision maker would set aside the ﬁrst and second criteria,
z1 and z2, because they are the most favourable to alter-
natives a1 and a2, respectively. In this way, the two
alternatives would be composed of the remaining criteria,
and they would be (i) indistinguishable from one another,
with values [z3, . . . , zsþm] for the criteria, for which
reason they can all be assigned the same ranking (eg,
a value of 1); and (ii) because they have the worst possible
values for their criteria, they would be less preferable than
any of the non-ﬁctitious alternatives.
Although the moderately pessimistic attitude was
originally introduced by Ballestero in order to deal with
the problem of the choice of alternatives under uncertain
scenarios (Ballestero, 2002), later the same author applied
it in a multicriteria context (Ballestero, 2004). Let us reﬂect
on the existing link between both approaches, since a priori
they might seem to be in conﬂict. As mentioned before,
to rank a set of alternatives it is necessary to quantify the
weight of each of the criteria that takes part in the
determination of their EI. Without loss of generality and
from the seller’s point of view: given an initial set of goods,
suppose the seller decides to compare the ai and aj
alternatives, in such a way that ai exhibits the greatest
value over aj in the zi criteria, and aj exhibits the greatest
value over ai in the zj criteria. Hence, zi and zj are the
most favourable criteria for ai and aj, respectively. When
comparing both alternatives, the moderately pessimistic
seller will be sceptical about the relevance of criteria zi
and zj. In fact, believing that the criteria for which his/her
property gets the greatest value are the most relevant in
the market is typical of an optimistic seller, not of a
moderately pessimistic one. Therefore, the decision maker
fears that alternative ai (aj) will not be so lucky as it would
be the case if its most favourable criteria were the most
relevant to the market (Ballestero, 2004, p 148).
When Deﬁnition 3.4 states that the most favourable in a
set of possibilities is not the one that will ultimately take
place, it means that this possibility will not be considered
by the moderately pessimistic decision maker when taking
his/her decision.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Moderate optimism
A moderately optimistic decision maker assumes that the
most unfavourable of a set of possibilities is not the one
that will ultimately take place (without making conjectures
about the other possibilities).
Given this attitude, the decision maker would consider
as ﬁctitious alternatives those that have only a single
criterion at its lowest value and all the rest at their highest
value (19):
a1 ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs ; . . . ; zsþm
a2 ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs ; . . . ; zsþm
. . .
as ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs; . . . ; zsþm
. . .
asþm ¼ ½z1; z2; . . . ; zs ; . . . ; zsþm ð19Þ
Like the moderate pessimists, the moderate optimists
would compare any two ﬁctitious alternatives, and because
of their attitude they would eliminate the attributes with
the lowest value. Let the two alternatives again be a1 and
a2. When criteria z1 and z2 are removed, the alternatives are
composed of the same maximum values in the rest of the
attributes [z3
, . . . , zsþm ]. Unlike for the moderate pessi-
mist, for the moderate optimist the ﬁctitious alternatives
represent better options than the non-ﬁctitious alternatives,
from which it follows that if the former are allocated unity
as index of efﬁciency, the latter are bound to take lower
values.
Proposition 3.2 The approaches of the moderate pessimist
and the moderate optimist generate the same vector of
criterion weights.
In the previous section, it was set forth that the solution
to the second step in the full ranking process was provided
by the system of equations associated with ﬁctitious
alternatives wlzl
 þPmwmzm ¼ 1, with l¼ 1, 2, . . . , sþm.
Extrapolating the system to alternatives (19), it is easy to
deduce the same solution (10) for the weights.
To sum up, the criteria weights are independent not
only of whether the decision makers are sellers or buyers,
but also of whether they have an optimistic or a pessimistic
attitude. The weights remain constant provided the
decision makers maintain a moderate attitude in line with
Deﬁnitions 3.4 and 3.5.
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4. Case study
For a practical application of the model expounded in
the previous section, a database was built of properties in
the city of Valencia, Spain, compiled from data provided
by a major Spanish valuation company (TABIMED). The
information relates to transactions carried out during the
second half of 2007.
The model could also be applied to a database of offered
houses; however, in this case, differences between seller and
buyer points of view should be considered as a limitation.
While housing price is real for the seller, in the sense that he
or she shows the willingness to sell the dwelling at the
offered price, the same does not occur for the buyer. Price
will be real for the buyer when he/she comes to a deal with
the seller about the transaction. In Spain, for example, the
ﬁnal price is estimated to be an average of 5% lower than
the offered one. However, when the database is only com-
prised by sold housings, like in our case study, prices have
been agreed to by sellers and buyers; hence, they could be
considered real prices for both sides (Aznar et al, 2010).
In this case study, the variables can be grouped into
three categories:
(1) Variables at individual property level: price (in euros),
usable space (in square metres), number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, area of the balcony or terrace
(in square metres), ﬂoor on which the property is
located, quality of construction (on a scale of 1–5).
(2) Variables at entire building level: number of storeys, lift
(a binary no/yes variable), age (in years).
(3) Environmental variables: urban environment quality
(scaled from 1 to 4), commercial environment variable
(1–3), income level (rising from 1 to 3).
The variable ‘orientation’ was removed from those
provided by the valuers because it turned out not to be
statistically signiﬁcant for explaining price. The qualitative
variables were determined according to the criterion of
‘better if more valuable’, and were assessed by the whole
team of valuers assigned by the ﬁrm to the city of Valencia.
For example, to assess the value of the urban environ-
ment on a scale of 1–4, the valuers took account of a series
of factors: local district communications (bus, under-
ground, tram), green spaces and recreation areas, distance
from the city centre and other important places in the
town, good maintenance of road and pavement surfaces,
lighting, cleaning, historic importance, and so on.
Before applying the models, it was necessary to transform
some of the original variables. For instance, the variables
‘number of bedrooms’ and ‘number of bathrooms’ were
replaced by the ratios ‘area/number of bedrooms’ and
‘number of bathrooms/number of bedrooms’, respectively.
The reason for the change in the ﬁrst case was that if two
properties have exactly the same area, the one with larger
bedrooms is valued more highly. The second ratio was
introduced for a similar reason: the number of bathrooms
cannot be valued in absolute terms but only relative to the
number of bedrooms.
In order to limit the number of properties analysed and
ensure a minimum of homogeneity throughout the sample,
they have been taken only from the areas with postcodes
46010, 46020, 46021, 46022, and 46023. These are areas
that are close to one another and, most importantly, they
share a similar degree and type of urban development.
Table 1 is a compilation of the principal statistics for all the
properties in the sample.
Applying the ﬁrst step described above produced a total
of 32 non-inefﬁcient properties. Their characteristics are
shown in Table 2.
At the second stage, the adapted SPM (see Section 3)
was applied to the previously mentioned set of properties.
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that calculating these
weights does not require transforming the criteria that act
as cost, and the result is invariant with respect to the
viewpoint adopted (seller or buyer) and to whether the
decision maker has an optimistic or pessimistic outlook.
All that is required is that the decision maker’s attitude be
Table 1 Basic statistics of the variables measured in the sample
Minimum Maximum Average Standard deviation
Price (euro) 150 000 590 000 259 730.6 91 438.6
Usable area (sq m) 55 176 100.0 23.2
Ratio area/number of bedrooms 20 77 34.0 8.8
Ratio bathrooms/bedrooms 0 1 0.5 0.2
Balcony or terrace area (sq m) 0 80 0.9 6.3
Ratio ﬂoor/number of storeys 0 1 0.6 0.3
Construction quality (1–5) 1 5 2.0 0.9
Lift (0/1) 0 1 0.8 0.4
Age (years) 0 77 17.7 12.2
Urban environment quality (1–4) 1 4 2.2 0.6
Commercial environment quality (1–3) 1 3 2.2 0.4
Income level (1–3) 1 3 1.6 0.7
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moderate. The last column of Table 2 shows the weights
that result from applying expression (10) on the original
criteria.
Observe how if the criteria would have been standar-
dized so that, z
0
lq ¼ (zlqzl)/(zlzl) all the criteria would
have the same unit weight, which simpliﬁes the mathema-
tical expressions maintaining the same results as in the
initial focus in which the weights are calculated based on
the original criteria.
The possibility that the introduction of a new alternative
might change the relative position of the rest of the
alternatives should be pointed out. For example, if the
price of the new alternative is lower than the minimum
price in the current set of alternatives, the relative ranking
of the other alternatives may be modiﬁed. Nevertheless,
this is a problem shared with other methodologies for the
ranking of alternatives.
The EI for each property has been calculated from either
expression (16) or (17) according to whether it is being
done from the seller’s or buyer’s viewpoint, and it is listed
in columns 14 and 15 of Table 2.
As the weight that results for the price (5.1176E-07) is
relatively low compared to the rest of the criteria, it might
be thought that the model is undervaluing this variable
despite the fact that it can be considered the most
important for practical purposes and sums up all the
information in the other criteria. To test this hypothesis,
the linear correlation coefﬁcient was calculated between the
EI for the seller and each of the criteria, and it was
observed that the highest value is precisely that of price
(92.7%), followed by area (68.2%), lift (51.7%) and age
(46.8%). Similar values have been obtained from the
buyer’s viewpoint, but with the opposite sign, as was to be
expected from what was stated in Corollary 3.1. This
constitutes conﬁrmation of the hypothesis that price is the
most pertinent variable for calculating the efﬁciency index
of properties.
With the aim of comparing and contrasting differences
with other known full ranking methods, the EI of the
housings that comprise the equilibrium set has been
calculated by means of the cross-efﬁciency analysis
(Sexton et al, 1986), both in its aggressive and benevolent
versions. The aggressive (benevolent) version seeks to
minimize (maximize) the efﬁciency of the population of the
decision making units (DMUs) while maintaining the
efﬁciency of the DMU under consideration ﬁxed. One
important difference between the SPM and the cross-
efﬁciency analysis is the different treatment for the criteria
weights: in the SPM these weights are invariable with
respect to the analysed DMU, while with the cross-
efﬁciency analysis the weights can differ from one DMU
to other.
Results from the cross-efﬁciency analysis application
appear in the last columns of the Table 2. Although in the
SPMmodel the EI from both the buyer and the seller point
of view are directly related, the same thing does not occur
in the cross-efﬁciency analysis, due to the different weights
obtained for the criteria in each DMU. In the aggressive
version, the correlation coefﬁcient between both EI is of
50.9%, while in the benevolent version the correlation
is of 74.2%. In our opinion, the use of the same weights
for the criteria, independently of the decision maker is
the buyer or the seller, and independently of the analysed
housing, is an SPM model advantage. This makes possible
the EI for the buyer to be the inverse of the EI for the
seller. In other words, to consider what is good for the seller
is no good for the buyer, and vice versa. This hypothesis
is not supported when the correlation coefﬁcient between
the EI of the buyer and the seller one distances from the
100%, like in the case of the cross-efﬁciency analysis
applied to the two studied versions.
5. Conclusions
This study reports an application of the SPM to the
ranking of alternatives or goods in a scenario where
multiple sellers and buyers are considered, and an
application to the residential market is presented. By
making a slight adaptation of the original model from
Ballestero (1999), the equilibrium set of goods is
characterized for seller and buyer, and from that the
EI is calculated.
The model used has a number of advantages over
other methods for making a full ranking of a set of efﬁcient
alternatives. It is a model based on Compromise Program-
ming, which has a robust axiomatic basis; and when
it calculates the weights of each attribute, it assumes
that the decision maker has a moderate attitude. The study
demonstrates that in the model put forward (i) the
weights assigned to each of the criteria are independent
of whether the decision maker is the seller or the buyer,
and this simpliﬁes calculating the EI; (ii) the EI for the
seller is inversely proportional to that for the buyer,
something that makes good economic sense; (iii) the
calculation of cost and/or beneﬁt weights coincides
regardless of whether the decision makers are optimistic
or pessimistic, provided that in either case they maintain a
moderate attitude. Furthermore, the weights of each
criterion are independent of the good valued, and
determining them does not carry a high computing
cost. Indeed, the model’s implementation in two steps
has a cost that increases only linearly with the number of
goods analysed. The EI obtained using this model not
only makes it possible to rank the goods in an ordinal way,
but also evaluates differences by cardinality.
Finally, the proposed model has been illustrated by
taking a broad sample of residential properties in the city
of Valencia, and observing that price is by far the most
signiﬁcant variable for calculating the EI.
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